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Introduction 
When Parliament abolished the death penalty for murder in England and Wales in the 
Murder (Abolition of Death Penalty) Act 1965, it did nothing more than that. It provided no 
alternative penalty. The substitute for the death sentence was one of life - ‘the only 
alternative that I know to death is life’, Lord Stonham observed in the House of Lords debate 
- an ambiguous but fascinating puzzle for the lexicographer, if not a problem posed by the 
draftsman of the statute. Parliament, in effect, assigned the hangman’s noose and his 
macabre accoutrements to the penal history museum.  
 
The statute said virtually nothing at all about what was to follow the court’s sentence for 
murder, ‘life after death’, except that a minimal provision allowing the trial judge to make a 
recommendation (not a legal rule) to suggest a minimum time in prison was added to the Bill 
at a late stage.2 Otherwise, the Act was silent but added a probationary life of five years, 
after which the ;law would have reverted, unhappily, to the Homicide Act 1957 without the 
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motion to endorse abolition in 1969 – in fact, completed happily to end capital punishment. A 
whole life in prison literally is a violation of human dignity. 
 
The law simply affirmed the alternative mandatory penalty to death, for the most serious 
crime in the criminal calendar, which interfered with the murderer’s liberty at the hands of 
executive government, for the rest of his life in prison or in the community on licence. It did 
not deal with any period of custody, but historically, and confirmed in the Homicide Act 1957 
in respect of non-capital murder, the sentence was a forfeiture of the prisoner’s self-imposed 
pattern of living, during which period of the sentence the prisoner might be released on 
licence, subject to subsequent recall to custody on the commission or threat of a further 
offence. Any discharge from custody was exercised by the Home Secretary in his discretion 
(this was the state of the release power until the adjustment of discharge in the Criminal 
Justice Act 1966). Today the sentence of life imprisonment is confirmed in section 269 of the 
Criminal Justice Act 2003. In schedule 21 to that Act the starting point to reflect the most 
serious culpability of the life sentence is a ‘whole life’ order, suggesting that the trial court 
may impose imprisonment for the rest of the prisoner’s natural life, for my part, the court 
order is in effect prospectively an entombment for life, a literal immuring within prison walls. 
As the Americans have dubbed the alternative to the death penalty, it is a life sentence 
'without the benefit of parole'. The irrevocable penalty of 'whole life', which was established by 
the Court of Appeal last year, was in English law held not to violate any of the human rights 
which the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights had, citing the absence of 
any English review procedure (the sentence being irrevocable), declared to be an infringement 
of the European Convention on Human Rights. The conflict of judicial opinion between the 
English court's ruling in municipal law contrasts with the declaration at Strasbourg exercising 
its supranational jurisdiction; by virtue of section 2(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998 the 
English courts were told 'to take into account' the rulings of the European Court of Human 
Rights. I leave to later the consequences of the judicial disagreement. What has been 
happening for the last 50 years that has left temporarily unsolved the status of the crime of 
murder in Europe? 
 
1 The Irrevocable Penalty of 'Whole life' 
There is no doubt that during the debates on the abolition of the death penalty in 1965, there 
were a number of amendments from members that would have introduced substitutes for the 
penalty of death. All amendments were stoutly resisted by the sponsors of the Bill (it was strictly 
a private members' Bill, although it was greatly facilitated, even legislatively organized, by the 
Labour Administration). The committee stage of the Bill in the House of Lords lasted an 
unconscionable time throughout the months leading up to October 1965, so that the authors of 
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the Bill were insistent that nothing should hamper the burning desire to be rid finally of capital 
punishment (by then there were only 2 or 3 a year). The imminence of the end of the 
parliamentary session dictated that any amendment imposing a form of sentence to be 
imposed was deliberately, as a matter of policy, resisted. So much so that on the receipt in the 
House of Commons to impose a probationary period on abolition (the Bill was to lapse unless 
within a period of five years Parliament had, by affirmative resolution, endorsed abolition; the 
Bill received an affirmation in December 1969).  
 
Without dilating upon the subsequent discussion about the alternative of life imprisonment, 
there was established what turned out to be a piece of mythology, that the rival disputants, the 
retentionists and the abolitionists, had agreed between themselves, and that a ‘pact' in 
Parliament had been reached, whereby the reform of capital punishment was accepted on the 
footing that the mandatory penalty of life imprisonment meant exactly that, that the alternative 
should be the rest of the prisoner's natural life, a 'whole life'. The myth was given credence by 
some evidence; an authority mistakenly submitted to a select committee of the House of 
Commons in the 1980s, chaired by Sir lvan Lawrence QC, that such a pact had in fact been 
established. The authenticity of such a bargain was, moreover, endorsed by Lady Scotland, as 
Attorney-General, presenting schedule 21 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, a massive piece of 
legislation engineered by David Blunkett; he had reacted to the loss of power, in matters of 
sentencing, to the judiciary in 1999. The fallacy of any such compact between abolitionists 
and receptionists has since been demonstrably proven; the claim does not now officially 
appear. The best documentary evidence that there was no such deal or pact is evidence of 
official action after abolition of the death penalty was confirmed by the motion of Parliament 
in December 1969. In March 1970 the Home Secretary (then Mr James Callaghan) referred 
to the Criminal Law Revision Committee (CLRC) to study a review of Offences against the 
Person. The terms of reference specifically asked the committee, composed exclusively of 
lawyers - High Court judges, criminal practitioners, academic lawyers and administrators of 
criminal justice, to deal with the law and penalty for murder and manslaughter, having regard 
to the recent ending of capital punishment. The CLRC issued an interim report on the 
penalty for murder, disclosing an early divided membership on the thorny question of the 
mandatory sentence. In its final report in 1980 the Committee said it was still unable to reach 
agreement, and therefore made no recommendation to introduce a discretionary sentence of 
life imprisonment, which had found some favour in an amendment (first mooted and then 
abandoned) by the Lord Chief Justice, Lord Parker, in July 1965. 
 
For many years the mandatory element in the sentence of life imprisonment was almost 
invariably criticised; it was particularly favoured by the judiciary. ln his retirement, Lord Lane, 
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who had been the Lord Chief Justice from 1982-1992, chaired a committee under the 
auspices of the Prison Reform Trust. lts powerful argument based on the experiment of a ban 
(unique in criminal justice history) on any judicial discretion to sentence a convicted murderer 
was fundamentally a breach of judicial impartiality, if not independence. Yet the official result 
has been a resoundingly negative attitude. The Government has no present intention to 
change the law and penalty of murder. 
 
It seems to me that, at heart, the issue of meaning in the classification of murders is 
essentially emotional. Does society expect its judicial process to mark out the gravity, the 
degree of moral culpability, as the template for the court sentence? Or is the public more 
concerned with punishment for murder than with the appropriate dispatch of the offender? The 
fulcrum of sentencing offenders is the role and function of punishment by society's instruments 
by judicial process, by which I mean both the attitude to the criminal offence and also the 
dispensing of a solution to future behaviour. Does the latter focus exclusively on the element of 
risk or is the role of discharge from custody, in part at least, a re-sentencing for the crime? The 
conflict judicially between Strasbourg and London reflects in their respective reasoning a leaning 
towards the current policies on penal affairs. 
 
The disagreement (not inflexibly irresoluble) turns on different political attitudes. Stripped of 
party political partisanship, the case is nevertheless instructive. Until the middle of the 1980s 
there had been no interference statutorily into the administration of the release of prisoners 
serving indeterminate prison sentences. Except in the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997 
Parliament conferred on the administration power for the fixing of the tariff and the 
reconsideration of discharge from custody in 1997, but only in exceptional circumstances, 
which justified the prisoner's release 'on compassionate grounds'. That provision was thought 
to apply to personal factors affecting the individual prisoner who might be suffering from 
terminal illness or imminent death. Strasbourg felt that the statutory regime for the review and 
possible reduction of the prisoner's custody in prison was insufficiently clear or certain so as 
to give rise to a violation of the right to be treated humanely. So the area of disagreement is 
about the construction of legislation in the member-State. Should that factor cause more than 
momentary discord?  
 
But the problem remains problematic. How does one measure one murder as worse than 
another? Here there is a measure of encouragement from the Strasbourg judgment. The Grand 
Chamber did not rule out the possibility that imprisonment for the rest of the prisoner's natural life 
could be vouchsafed. Why not, you may ask. But at least it confirmed that such a life sentence 
had to have built in a provision that established a regime of reducible imprisonment. That did not 
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alter the fact that a whole life prisoner might in practice die in prison before the opportunity for a 
review of his sentence. 
 
Underlying the judicial attitude, there remains an issue of comparative culpability that 
warrants an irreducible amount of incarceration forever. The English approach is 
discouraging of the criteria for 'the worst of the worst' assumes the absence from the 
intentional killer suffers from consideration of some mental disorder that may have afflicted 
the prisoner in the degree of moral culpability for the physical horror of the homicidal act. 
What is the evidence of the mitigation of horrendous homicides? 
 
The specially constituted, five most senior judges in the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) 
had recently 'to consider ... three appeals by defendants on whom a whole life order had been 
imposed ... in a case where it was contended that the trial judge had been mistaken in the 
view that the decision ... precluded the imposition of a whole life order' as a tariff of a period of 
imprisonment. ln his concluding remarks delivering the judgment of the court, the Lord Chief 
Justice, Lord Thomas, noted that counsel for the Crown had told their Lordships that 'it might 
be many years before the applications [under section 30 of the Criminal Sentences Act 1997] 
may be made' and that it would be assumed by the Court of Appeal that it would not discount 
the possibility of such applications arising very much sooner, that they would then be 
determined in accordance with existing legal principles. ln interpreting this at least uncertain 
review procedure, the English court said that it 'provides for the possibility and hence gives to 
each such prisoner the possibility of exceptional release'. The possibility of discharge from 
prison alive falls short of the provision of the probability of a delayed review which is traditionally 
less exacting on an individual who faces the moral meaning of a statutory provision that 
ordinarily functions in that individual's favour. Even the likelihood of a review at some time 
before the end of natural life would be the grant of a real, as opposed to an optimistic 
speculation of intended hope at the outset. No doubt, the less onerous burden on the penal 
administration to consider any review of a sentence tends to support the English (municipal) 
judicial knowledge of penal administrators' pragmatic attitude, as opposed to the rational 
approach of the Strasbourg judges, viewing the function of interpreting an English statute in the 
context of the human rights granted by the European Convention on Human Rights (specifically 
endorsed in the Human Rights Act 1998, under which the English courts must 'take account of' 
the Strasbourg jurisprudence). But an English version does not affect the view of one academic 
lawyer. Professor David Ormerod describes the two elements of the Strasbourg construction as 
having been 'underplayed' by the English judges: a decorous way of saying that they carry less 
weight; they are wrong. I much prefer the reasoning of the 17 (split 16-1) judges at Strasbourg. 
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But does the disagreement, limited as it is, on the construction of a municipal statute by the two 
courts matter? Each has its function; each can reasonably come to a diametrically opposed 
conclusion. The two functions are susceptible to judicial dialogue, as witness the remarks of 
Lord Phillips in the Hardcastle case about the admissibility of untested statements in a witness 
report to investigating police officers. After all, even the dialogue of the deaf in which the two 
courts are judicially unresponsive to what the other says, at least initially, may take place. 
Otherwise, extra-judicial pronouncements may resolve the apparent conflict. And even then, 
the law is relatively clear. Parliament may decide to go down the statutory route in favour of its 
authority as the guardian of international human rights' Parliament may prefer the maintenance 
of the utterance of its own courts as still complying with the human rights convention. lt may 
even countenance being the subject of a report to the Council of Europe as a member-State in 
violation of a Court ruling, or diplomatically turn to the wisdom of civilised institutions to resolve 
the disagreement, and move on. 
 
The whole life order (or life imprisonment without the benefit of parole) is instinctively applicable 
to the exceptional and rare cases of murder committed by persons serving the custodial part of 
a life sentence. The making of a whole life order, the Court of Appeal observed, may require 
detailed consideration of the individual circumstances of each case. lt is likely to be rare that the 
circumstances will be such as to qualify for a whole life order to be imposed. One decision is no 
guide to any supposedly similar cases. lf the rarity of a whole life sentence is to be statutorily 
endorsed, then section 269 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 should state that it is inflicted only 
for reasons of dangerousness and not as an additional punishment for the 'worst of the 
worst' murders. But is the concept (even if tenable) in practice worthwhile? I think not. 
 
2 'Worst of the Worst' 
To date there are around 50 prisoners subject to 'whole life' orders. Numerically, that figure 
is insignificant in the context of a daily average population of approximately 85,000 prisoners, 
although the number of 'lifers' (those serving sentences of life imprisonment with determinate 
periods of minimum sentences) is statistically significant at about 12,000. The indeterminacy 
of the sentence spills over to infect the penal policy which has become bipartisan between 
the two major political parties. The adoption since 2003 in the UK of the concept of whole life 
orders displays a similar discord in the USA as the instinctive alternative to impending 
abolition of the death penalty. Recently some six states have adopted the formula that is 
questionably a cruel and unusual punishment in violation of international human rights law. 
 
The principle reflecting the infliction of condign punishment is dictated by a knee-jerk 
reaction to populism. It was given expression in the judicial reaction to the sentencing 
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structure adopted in the Criminal Justice Act 2003. That legislative move sought to link the 
judiciality of the 1980s with popular penal action. 
 
In 1981 public interest was aroused by the prosecution of the Yorkshire Ripper for a series of 
murders; most of the unfortunate victims were prostitutes. The defendant Peter Sutcliffe was 
thwarted in his attempts to plead manslaughter on the grounds of diminished responsibility 
for serious mental disorder, a partial defence to a murder charge that was introduced in the 
Homicide Act 1957 (which also established non-capital murder with the tell-tale sentence of 
life imprisonment). The trial judge, Boreham J, declined to accept the plea bargain; the trial 
proceeded on the basis of the plea of diminished responsibility, unanimously supported by 
all the forensic psychiatrists. The jury, however, rejected the defence, and Sutcliffe was 
sentenced to life imprisonment, with a minimum recommendation that he serve 40 years. (At 
that time the tariff for a life sentence was subject to an administrative recommendation only 
to the Lord Chief Justice, who was then Lord Bingham.) Records indicate that subsequently 
that great judge thought that the failed defence of mental disorder should be taken into 
account for the purpose of determining the minimum term to be served. Accordingly, he 
expressed the inapplicability of 'whole life' and substituted for 40 years a period of 35 years 
as reflecting a commensurate period of custodial treatment. In the normal course of events 
that would have concluded the judicial pointer towards the penalty for the particular murder. 
With Schedule 21 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, classifying the starting points for 
minimum terms of imprisonment before any question of discharge of a 'lifer' from custodial 
treatment could be considered, the concept of 'whole life' for the most serious category of 
murder entered the legislative scene. But in order to regularise the new structure of a life 
sentence with a whole life order directed to its penal application, the judiciary re-entered the 
process to re-hear the sentence that should be served as a minimum term. 
 
Mr Justice Mitting, at first instance, did not agree with the pronouncement of sentence in 
1981; in 2010 he opted for the 'whole life' order as the appropriate penalty for the multiple 
crimes that evoked the epithet of 'the worst of the worst', which had been rejected at the time 
of the original sentence. The 'whole life' order was upheld by the Court of Appeal in a 
significant judgment delivered by the last Lord Chief Justice, Lord Judge. He reasoned that 
the imposition of a 'whole life' order was amply justified. His reasoning is legally questionable, 
even if the verdict had popular appeal. While Lord Judge did not deny that circumstances 
surrounding the homicidal events and the perpetrator's perceived intention to kill unlawfully 
were relevant to the issue of the correct penal disposal, he held - better to regard the finding 
as speculation - that the jury convicting Sutcliffe had ostensibly rejected the psychiatric 
material of an existing mental disorder: Sutcliffe must have lied to the psychiatrists and to the 
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jury about his true intention to kill. Those lies made it inevitable that the homicides were 
rightly categorised as the worst of the worst murders. There seems to me to be a jump in the 
logical thinking. The defence of diminished responsibility rests upon the defendant, on a 
balance of probabilities. Maybe the jury had concluded that, in assessing the weight of the 
psychiatrists' evidence, it had failed to prove more probably than not, that it established a 
substantial responsibility for the homicides. The Court's reasoning, even if sound, discloses 
the judicial attitude towards the worst of the worst murders simply by reference to the nature 
of the killing. The killer's mental condition did not detract from the heinous nature of the 
murders. 
 
The story does not end there. The psychiatric authorities in Broadmoor that had taken care 
of Sutcliffe over many years had concluded that he was no longer a risk of committing any 
further crimes. He was aged, he was blind and was confined to a wheelchair: he was 
physically harmless. At least his condition of potential discharge was favourable, even if 
there were a sound policy decision not to release the prisoner. I do not argue against the 
policy not to release the prisoner on licence. It is, however, to be deplored that the 'whole 
life' sentence itself is a violation of the international law of human rights, whatever its 
geographical or institutional source. 
 
What happens next? A further decision of the Strasbourg court has clarified the relationship; 
the court decided in August not to award compensation or costs to UK prisoners, whose 
disenfranchisement for the time being was a breach of human rights. That demonstrates the 
reality that the Strasbourg court is not unobservant of its function. Some would say that the 
court looked over the abyss of its forensic encounter and backed off its warlike noises in 
order to avoid a whirlwind of opposition on a scale that might threaten its legitimacy. But in 
short, the correctness of denying non-pecuniary compensation has to underline the reality 
that the Parliament of any member-State with a clear voice is entitled to act other than in 
accordance with a Strasbourg finding. Put shortly, what Strasbourg says in the interpretation 
of a human right is the word of a supranational court, speaking to the courts of the various 
countries. What the latter courts will do is a matter of law according to their national legal 
systems. At that point the final say rests with the compatibility or incompatibility of the two 
laws. 
 
The illegality under Article 3 of the ECHR of the irreducible life sentence - in US terms, the 
sentence of life imprisonment without benefit of parole - has had its first transatlantic impact. 
On 4 September 2014 the European Court of Human Rights in Trabelsi v Belgium found that 
the Belgian government had violated the Convention by extraditing a Belgian national to the 
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District of Colombia where there is no adequate mechanism for reviewing the whole life 
sentence. As yet, there has been no American response to the condemnation of Belgium for 
having extradited a suspected terrorist to the United States. 
 
Conclusion 
One would not expect a ringing endorsement of the claim by Oscar Wilde in the classic 
Ballad of Reading Gaol, 'that every prison that men build I Is built with bricks of shame'. But 
one might hope that at all times the judges, shamefully or not, would take account of 
criminological opinion, that overcrowded and unrelieved imprisonment is inhumane and 
wasteful of civilised mankind. Moreover, we cannot afford the prospect of a generation of 
geriatrics in prison. Above all, imprisonment should be severely qualified as an institution for 
public safety. The duty of any parole system is risk assessment, which contains no re-
evaluation of the trial sentence. Professors Roger Hood and Carolyn Hoyle write in sedate 
terms and restrained language in The Death Penalty (which Oxford University Press is due 
to publish in its fifth edition) about lengthy imprisonment. They state: 
 Those who campaign for the humane treatment of prisoners will need to refocus their 
 attention on creating for life-sentenced prisoners a humane prison environment, 
 accompanied by an effective and judicious system for reviewing suitability for release 
 that adequately protects the public while respecting the humanity of the prisoner. In 
 our opinion, sentences of life imprisonment which preclude any possibility of parole 
 are not only inhumane, they are unnecessary and counter-productive. They raise 
 many of the human rights issues that have been at the heart of the attack on the 
 death penalty itself. They too should be abolished. 
 
Fifty years after the demise of capital punishment, a rational and practical alternative to the 
death penalty is still unfinished business. 
 
A Coda 
To conclude a lecture that begins with a titled question mark or is deliberately ambiguous (to 
which I readily confess in this case) imposes on its lecturer a duty to explain the question or 
cure the ambiguity. The ending in 1965 of capital punishment for murder restored to 
Executive Government the established release powers to those serving life imprisonment for 
non-capital murder under the Homicide Act 1957. It exemplified the acceptance of the basic 
human dignity of every citizen, with the right to review at any time the indeterminate 
sentence. Penal policy encompassed the totality of an individual's right to liberty, subject to 
its limitations under the rules of criminal justice - a profound area of the Rule of Law. The title 
to any lecture on this subject, 'what is life?' must encompass an apt title or, at least, sub-title. 
For me, the latter should read: Life after death: a proportionate loss of liberty. 
 
